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CONCLUSION

In Smith v. Maryland the Supreme Court held that there was no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from a private residential telephone. Based upon opinion and belief rather than demonstration
or experience, the Court held that not only did the petitioner exhibit no
subjective expectation of privacy, but that even if he had, society would
not recognize that expectation as reasonable. In so holding, the Court
foreclosed any future argument that pen register surveillance should be
subject to the restrictions of the fourth amendment. It is unfortunate that
the Court closed the book on this chapter of the fourth amendment without examining factors such as the potential for abuse of pen register surveillance, the possible chilling effect on first amendment free speech rights,
and the general absence of exigent circumstances that would prevent the
timely procurement of a warrant. Indeed, when these factors are properly
weighed, the general public, of whose expectations the Court speaks so
knowledgeably, may not only be prepared to recognize Michael Lee
Smith's expectations of privacy as reasonable, but may demand such protection for themselves.
Les Brannon

Barker v. Allied Supermarket: An Expanded Interpretation of
the UCC's "Contract for Sale"
Brack Barker entered Arlan's Food Store in Midwest City, Oklahoma,
for the purpose of purchasing groceries. When he lifted a carton of Dr
Pepper from the self-service shelf and attempted to place it in his shopping
cart, one of the bottles exploded, injuring Barker's right eye. Two years
and one day later Barker filed suit against both the retailer and the manufacturer of the beverage for negligence and breach of an implied warranty
of merchantability. The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrers,
concluding that the action sounded in tort' and was barred by the applicaLegislative Proposal,38 S. CAL. L. REV. 622, 628 (1965). Justice Marshall did not expressly
discuss the chilling effect of the pen register on the first amendment freedoms of the groups
he enumerated, but that appears to be the next logical step in his analysis. But see Note,
supra note 1, at 1035 n.45.
1. In sustaining the demurrers, the trial court relied on Kirkland v. General Motors
Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974). In Kirkland the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the
two-year tort limitations period applies in actions brought by persons physically injured by a
defective product. The trial court in Barker interpreted Kirkland as also holding that the

limitations period was based on a theory of manufacturer's products liability and applied
whether or not the plaintiff pleaded contractual liability based on implied warranty. Barker
v. Allied Supermarket, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 6 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976). The trial court interpreted
Kirkland as abolishing an action for breach of warranty. Id at 8.
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ble two-year statute of limitations. 2 The Oklahoma Court of Appeals reversed in part, 3 holding that plaintiff had pleaded a cause of action for
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability against the food store4
and that the limitations period for this cause of action was five years.' On
separate applications of the plaintiff and the food store, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, decision of court of appeals vacated judgment of trial court reversed and remanded: A buyer of goods
who is invited by a merchant to take possession thereof from a self-service
display and to defer payment to some time subsequent to the taking of
possession has the protection of an implied warranty of merchantability
that arises from a contract for sale. Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d
870 (Okla. 1979).6
I.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-"CONTRACT FOR SALE"

When a consumer sues a retailer for damages for breach of an implied
warranty, it is necessary to establish the existence of a warranty.7 Because
article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides that a warranty arises from a contract for sale, 8 the consumer ordinarily must prove
2. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West 1960).
3. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the suit against the defendant manufacturer, holding that plaintiff had failed to allege a contractual relationship
between himself and the bottler and that such a relationship was essential for an action

under the Uniform Commercial Code. Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 6, 10
(Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
4. The court of appeals found that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Kirkland,
see note I supra, and stated that breach of warranty is still recognized as a valid cause of
action as provided in the Uniform Commercial Code. 20 U.C.C. Rep. at 9; see Kirkland v.
General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1364-65 (Okla. 1974). See also O'Neal v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 523 P.2d 614 (Okla. 1974); Moss v. Polyco, Inc., 522 P.2d 622 (Okla. 1974).
5. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-725(I) (West 1963).
6. The court also held that the UCC-based implied warranty of food or drink under
U.C.C. § 2-314 extends from a food packager-bottler to a consumer at a retail supermarket
notwithstanding lack of privity. Accordingly, Barker could pursue his warranty claim
against the bottler. See Jackson v. Cushing Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 445 P.2d 797 (Okla.
1968); Southwest Ice & Dairy Prods. Co. v. Faulkenberry, 203 Okla. 279, 220 P.2d 257
(1950). The recent trend hasbeen to reject the privity requirement completely in actions in
which the buyer seeks to recover for product-caused personal injuries against a remote manufacturer. See generally Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 39, 88 (1961). Even in jurisdictions that still
enforce the privity requirement in products liability actions brought on a theory of breach of
warranty, courts have abolished the privity requirement as against public policy in cases
based on an injury caused by food products. See id.at 71. This exception to the general rule
applies even when the injury is caused by a defect in the container in which the food product
was sold. See, e.g., Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d I1, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814
(1963).
7. Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874 (1974), ad in part and
rev'd inpartsub nom. Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592,
332 A.2d 1 (1975).
8. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) provides:
Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for
value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a
sale.
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first that a contract for sale existed at the time of the injury.9 Whether a
contract for sale exists when a consumer removes goods from the grocery
shelf in a self-service store' ° is a question that has been addressed by the
courts of appeals in Maryland," Georgia,' 2 and North Carolina.' 3 Each
court found that a contract for sale is formed when the consumer removes
a product from the shelf. Relying on the relevant provisions of the UCC,
these courts have recognized that the phrase "contract for sale" generally
includes both a present sale and a contract to sell at a future time' 4 and
that passage of title does not determine whether a contract for sale has
been formed.' 5 Further, these courts have found that the consumer's option to return merchandise 6at any time prior to payment does not affect the
formation of the contract.'
The leading decision to find the formation of a contract in the act of
selecting a product from the shelf is Sheeskin v. Giant Food,Inc. 1"In this
case the Maryland court reasoned that the retailer's act of placing the
goods upon the shelf with a price affixed to their container constituted an
9. Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874, 880 (1974), adin
part andrev'din part sub nom. Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273
Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975); U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 13. The consumer must also show
that the warranty was breached and that the breach of warranty was the proximate cause of
the loss sustained.
10. Cf.Green v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 541 P.2d 200 (Okla. 1975) (breach of warranty
clearly existed when bottle exploded after consumer had paid for it).
11. The leading case is Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874
(1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975). In Sheeskin bottles of Coca-Cola exploded
after the consumer had lifted the bottles and had taken three or four steps toward his shopping cart.
12. In Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691 (1976), bottles
exploded as the consumer was placing them on the check-out counter for payment.
13. In Gillispie v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 14 N.C. App. 1, 187 S.E.2d 441 (1972), a
bottle of Sprite exploded as the consumer was carrying it directly to the check-out counter.
See generally Annot., 78 A.L.R.3d 697 (1977).
14. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) provides: "In this Article unless the context otherwise requires
'contract' and 'agreement' are limited to those relating to the present or future sale of goods.
'Contract for sale' includes both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a
future time." See Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691, 694
(1976); Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874, 883 (1974), alrd inpart
andrev'd inpart sub nom. Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md.
592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975); cf.Gillespie v. Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co., 14 N.C. App. 1, 187 S.E.2d
441, 444 (1972) (court was concerned with when a sale occurs).
15. U.C.C. § 2-401 provides: "Each provision of this Article with regard to the rights,
obligations and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies
irrespective of title to the goods except where the provision refers to such title." (Emphasis
added.) See Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1976);
Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874, 883 (1974), a fid in part and
rev'din partsub nom. Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592,
332 A.2d 1 (1975). Butsee Gillispie v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 14 N.C. App. 1, 187 S.E.2d
441, 444 (1972) (passage of title was determinative of whether a contract for sale existed).
16. Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1976); Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611,318 A.2d 874, 883 (1974), af'din part andrev'd in
part sub nom. Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332
A.2d 1 (1975); Gillispie v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 14 N.C. App. 1,187 S.E.2d 441, 444
(1972).
17. 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874 (1974), aft'd inpart and rev'd inpart sub nom. Giant
Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975).

19801

NOTES

1297

offer to the consumer to enter into a contract.18 Because the UCC provides
that an offer to make a contract invites acceptance in any manner reasonable under the circumstances,' 9 under the terms of the retailer's offer a
consumer could accept by promising to pay for the goods, as evidenced by
taking physical possession of the goods after removing them from the
shelf.2° The Maryland court held that a contract for sale came into being
at that moment. 2' The court reached this conclusion even after recogniz22
ing that a customer may change his mind and return goods to the shelf.
The consumer's option to replace the product on the shelf merely indicated
an agreement by the contracting parties to permit the consumer to end his
contract.2 3

The court acknowledged the existence of contrary decisions in other jurisdictions. 24 Nevertheless, the court distinguished these decisions because
they were decided apart from the UCC and pursuant to law that held passage of title to be a legal prerequisite to any warranty action. 25 Each of
these decisions had found that a contract did not exist because the consumer had not yet purchased the good.26 The Maryland court rejected this
reasoning, holding that a contract for sale did not depend upon the passage
of title and could arise before payment actually was made and title
passed.2 7

In Fender v. ColonialStores, Inc. 28 the Georgia Court of Appeals agreed
with the Sheeskin decision, finding that a contract for sale arose when a
18. 318 A.2d at 822. The terms of the offer were that the retailer would pass title to the
goods when the buyer presented them at the check-out counter and paid the stated price.
But see Gillispie v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 14 N.C. App. 1,187 S.E.2d 441, 444 (1972)
(title passed when buyer took possession of goods with intention of paying for them).
19. U.C.C. § 2-206(l) provides: "Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances (a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances ....
20. 318 A.2d at 882. A consumer could also accept by paying for the goods or by promising to pay for the goods, as evidenced by physical delivery of the goods to the check-oit
counter. Id
21. Id at 883. The contract is a bilateral executory agreement to transfer title to the
goods for a price. See note 54 infra.
22. 318 A.2d at 883.
23. Id
24. See Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores, 319 Mass. 224, 65 N.E.2d 305 (1946) (the
offer could not be considered as accepted until the price was paid); Day v. Grand Union Co.,
280 A.D. 253, 113 N.Y.S.2d 436, affidmem., 304 N.Y. 821, 109 N.E.2d 609 (1952) (no warranty was implied because there was no contract for sale); Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63
A.2d 24 (1949) (to find a contract of sale upon the buyer's selecting the bottles from the shelf
would "require that the law remain blind to reality and completely ignore established basic
legal concepts").
25. 318 A.2d at 883.
26. See Day v. Grand Union Co., 280 A.D. 253, 113 N.Y.S.2d 436, 437, ardmem., 304
N.Y. 821, 109 N.E.2d 609 (1952), in which the court stated that "if the classic tests to be
applied to contracts are employed here there was yet no contract and, of course, no implied
warranty resting on contract."
27. 318 A.2d at 883. The court emphasized that the UCC embodied a flexible approach
to contracting, rejecting the more rigid concept of title to which the Uniform Sales Act adhered. See note 14 supra.
28. 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691 (1976).
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consumer removed goods from the shelf.29 By taking physical possession
of the goods, the consumer promised to pay their stated
price; this promise
30
was sufficient consideration to support a contract.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reached a similar result in Gillispie
v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 3' but based its decision on analysis of
passage of title and occurrence of the sale. The court first listed several
basic UCC principles: warranties arise only upon a sale of goods; 32 a sale
consists of the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price; 33 and
unless otherwise explicitly agreed, title passes to the buyer at the time and
place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the
delivery of the goods.34 With these principles in mind, the court concluded
that once the consumer took possession of the goods with the intention of
paying for them, the seller had completed his delivery and title had
passed.3 ' 37This title-based rationale was rejected in both Fender36 and
Sheeskin.
Finally, in Lucehesi v. HC Bohack Co. 38 a bottle of soda exploded
when a consumer placed it on the checkout counter. The New York
Supreme Court allowed recovery based on its finding that an implied warranty existed. The court did not, however, discuss the preliminary issue of
whether a contract for sale had been established.
II.

BARKER V. ALLIED SUPERMARKET

Against this background, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma decided
Barker v. Allied Supermarket as a case of first impression in Oklahoma.
The court identified the threshold question as whether a contract for sale
existed. 39 Agreeing with the decisions based on the UCC,4 ° the court concluded that a contract for sale did exist; the merchant's act of stocking the
self-service display with goods represented an offer to the shopper to enter
into a contract for their sale. 4 In the absence of a clear statement by the
29. 225 S.E.2d at 694.
30. Id
31. 14 N.C. App. 1, 187 S.E.2d 441 (1972).
32. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) provides that a warranty is implied in a "contract for sale," but
the court concerned itself with a discussion of a "sale."
33. The UCC defines a sale as "the passing of title from the seller to a buyer for a
price." U.C.C. § 2-106(1).
34. Id § 2-401(2).
35. 187 S.E.2d at 444.
36. 225 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Ga. App. 1976).
37. 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874, 884 (1974), afl'din part and rev'd in part sub nom.
Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975).
38. 8 U.C.C. Rep. 326, 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
39. 596 P.2d at 871.
40. The court did not expressly distinguish the passage of title approach taken in Gillispie. The court noted, however, that title to goods has been deemphasized under the UCC.
In particular, it cited U.C.C. § 2-401, see note 15 supra, which states that unless a particular
UCC provision specifically refers to title, the rights and remedies of purchasers as set forth
in art. 2 apply irrespective of title. The court stated that this exception in § 2-401 had not
been triggered and that title to the bottle was thus irrelevant. 596 P.2d at 873.
41. Id at 872.
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seller that acceptance could be accomplished only by an act of payment, it
was reasonable for the consumer to accept the offer by promising to deliver
the goods to the checkout counter and pay for them.4 2 The court stated
that the consumer's acceptance was sufficiently evidenced by his taking
physical possession of the goods.4 3 According to the court, the custom in
grocery stores of allowing shoppers to change their minds and to return
goods to the shelves did not prevent a contract for sale from arising at the
moment the shopper lifted the goods from the shelf;4 4 instead, the permission to return the goods is a custom of the trade, which in the absence of
modification becomes a part of the shopping agreement. 5 An exercise of
the contractual provision would therefore merely terminate the contract
pursuant to the parties' shopping agreement. 6 In addition, the court noted
that if the seller breached before the buyer paid for the goods, the buyer
could cancel the contract and pursue his remedies for breach.4 7
The essential issue in Barker was whether a contract for sale is formed
at the moment a consumer in a self-service store takes possession of an
item, despite the consumer's right to reshelve the item for any reason
before payment.4 8 The court in Barker held that a contract is formed, determining that the buyer's right to reshelve unwanted goods entitled the
consumer to terminate the contract.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's discussion of termination was premature, however, because a party cannot terminate a contract unless a legally
enforceable contract existed before the termination. 49 Accordingly, the
court's treatment of the buyer's option to return goods begs the question of
whether a contract has been formed. The applicable provisions of the
UCC or, if none are applicable, the law of contracts, determine whether a
legally enforceable obligation exists.5 Since the UCC does not specify
42. Id
43. Id, see note 19 supra.

44. 596 P.2d at 872.
45. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) provides: "'Agreement' means the bargain of the parties in fact
as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of
dealing or usage oftrade or course ofperformance as provided in this Act ...." (Emphasis
added.) Course of dealing is defined in U.C.C. § 1-205. See generally Levie, Trade Usage
and Custom under the Common Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1101 (1965).

46. U.C.C. § 2-106(3) provides: "'Termination' occurs when either party pursuant to a
power created by agreement or law puts an end to the contract otherwise than for its breach.
On 'termination' all obligations which are still executory on both sides are discharged but
any right based on prior breach or performance survives." See 596 P.2d at 872.
47. 596 P.2d at 873. The UCC provides that "'[c]ancellation' occurs when either party
puts an end to the contract for breach by the other. The effect of cancellation is the same as
that of 'termination,' except that the cancelling party also retains any remedy for breach of
the whole contract. U.C.C. § 2-106(4).
48. 596 P.2d at 872.
49. "Contract" is defined as "the total legal obligation which results from the parties'
agreement as affected by this Act and any other applicable rules of law." U.C.C. § 1201(1 1); see I A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 3 (1950); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 1 (1973). Under the UCC, "contract" is distinct from "agreement," which includes all
agreements whether legally enforceable or not.
50. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) provides:
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their lan-
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what makes a contract legally enforceable, a court is directed by section 110351 of the UCC to look to the common law of contracts.5 2 Pursuant to
common law principles of contract, a contract did not exist in Barker at
the time the bottle exploded. 3 As a general rule, mutuality of obligation is
a prerequisite to the formation of an executory bilateral 54 contract. 55 The
doctrine of mutuality of obligation states that when the sole consideration
in a bilateral contract is the parties' promises, the promises must be binding on both parties.5 6 If an executory contract based upon the consideration of mutual promises gives one party an absolute and arbitrary right to
cancel the contract at any time, the contract is illusory and unenforceable.57 Accordingly, when a consumer in a self-service store takes possession of a good by removing it from the store shelf, no contract for sale
arises. The buyer's option to return the good at any time prior to paying
for it destroys the mutuality of obligation and renders the shopping agreement unenforceable. In Barker, therefore, since no contract for sale existed, no implied warranty could arise, and thus no claim for breach of an
implied warranty of merchantability could prevail. Since Barker's action
in tort was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the court should
have denied Barker any recovery.
guage or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing
or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in this Act ....
Whether an agreement has legal consequences
determined
.... by the pro isions of
contracts
law of is
this Act, if applicable,- otherwise by the
(Emphasis added.)
51. U.C.C. § 1-103 provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act,
the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity
to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions."
52. The common law remains in force in aid of the general statutes of Oklahoma, and
therefore the UCC. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2 (West 1960).
53. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
54. An executory bilateral contract consists of mutual promises made in exchange for
each other by the contracting parties. A bilateral contract is distinct from a unilateral contract, which consists of a promise made by only one of the contracting parties. In a unilateral contract only the promisor is under an enforceable legal duty. In a bilateral contract,
however, both parties are promisors, and thus both are under an enforceable legal duty. See
generally I A. CORBIN, supra note 49, §§ 21, 62, 70.
The self-service transaction at issue in Barker was a bilateral agreement. The food store
had promised to transfer title to the goods for a price in exchange for the consumer's promise to pay for the goods as evidenced by the act of taking possession of the goods by removing them from the store shelf. Thus, a promise is given in exchange for a promise. See
Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874 (1974), affidinpartandrev'din
part sub nom. Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332
A.2d 1 (1975). Whether this bilateral transaction is a contract depends on whether these
mutual promises are binding on both parties. See text accompanying note 56 infra.
55. Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 P. 86 (1918); see IA A. CORBIN, supra note 49,

§ 152.
56. See Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1976);
Consolidated Pipe Line Co. v. British Am. Oil Co., 163 Okla. 171, 21 P.2d 762 (1933); 1 A.
CORBIN, supra note 49, § 147. See also Adalex Laboratories, Inc. v. Krawitz, 270 P.2d 346
(Okla. 1954).
57. See, e.g., R.F. Baker & Co. v. P. Ballantine & Sons, 127 Conn. 680, 20 A.2d 82
(1942). See generally I & IA A. CORBIN, supra note 49, §§ 147, 152.

